

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Division of Domestic Operations.

FROM : Security Officer, Djakarta *CE*

SUBJECT: Assassination Attempt - President Sukarno

Ref: Your Memorandum dated June 8, 1962.

DATE: June 19, 1962

Your memorandum concerning this office's report which described subject incident is very much appreciated. The question of how the assassin managed to secure an official invitation card was referred to CAS Djakarta. CAS reports that the official invitations for the celebration at Merdeka Palace were sent out before more strict security measures went into effect May 13, 1962, and although it was realized that control over the passes had been rather lax it was impossible to recall them or to issue new passes before May 14.

As our report noted, word had been received by Indonesian protective authorities before May 14 that an attempt on the President's life might be made during the Idul Adha celebration. However, the tighter protective measures which were adopted as a result of this information were too late to prevent the issuance of several passes to personnel whose bona fides could not be vouched for. Taking advantage of this laxity, the assassin had asked a friend in the Palace Secretariat for nine passes; the friend managed to produce only two. As things turned out, several other members of the rebel ring managed to infiltrate the crowd at the Palace without any passes at all, although they took no active part in the assassination attempt.

Since the May 14 incident all Palace passes have been recalled and careful investigations have been made of personnel to whom they will be issued. A special code number is stamped on each pass, and, to forestall those who did not return their passes, no pass is valid without the code number. Many other procedures designed to increase the President's safety have also been instituted, and CAS has reported them to Washington as they have come to their attention. One rather amusing sidelight is that a day or so after the incident Indonesian security authorities approached a representative of the AID Public Safety Division, asking for information concerning metal detectors used by U. S. protective personnel. The Indonesians said they only needed such a device "for the use of Customs Officers". The PSD representative says he kept a straight face when he promised to try to secure such information "for Indonesian Customs".

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PPRC, Japan

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY URUGUAY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,829

SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 24 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 67186

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (23 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2111

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B).

2:10 PM 11/23/63

1. RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/ (CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING TO STONE THE EMBASSY. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES. KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME).

2. THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD

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INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		IN 6 7186
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		PAGE 2

MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDEO HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE 3000 PERSONS MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCOS.

END OF MESSAGE

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MAY 17 1962

In reply refer to
100-1

TO: The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington 25, D. C.

FROM: John Newman, Chief,
Records and Services Branch,
for the Director,
Office of Security.

SUBJECT: AMERICAN DEFECTORS: STATUS OF IN THE U. S. S. R.

There is attached a copy of report entitled "Status of American Defectors in the Soviet Union" which was prepared and sent by the Security Officer at the American Embassy in Moscow, April 23, 1962. The memorandum covers:

MARTIN, Morris and Willie

BUTENKIN, Joseph

CHERNO, Leo

GLOBINA, Vladimir

KESTEL, Robert

The Security Officer has commented that Morris Martin and William Mitchell are entitled due to their status from the local comm. If and when they come to appearance, it will be reported.

Copies of the dispatches on Butenkin and Chernob were furnished your Bureau and CIA via liaison. If additional information is desired on any of the individuals, please advise, and we will endeavor to obtain it.

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OFFICE OF SECURITY		
MAY 18 1962		
RESEARCH & FILE SECTION		

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COPY TO: The Deputy Director, Plans,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

WFI
SOV
LIR/CS

SY FILE RE SUBJ
BLOCK, MORRIS & MOLLIE
DUTKANICZ, JOSEPH
OSWALD, LEE
LI
SLOBODA, VLADIMIR
WEBSTER, ROBERT

SCAIST/AL:RMB:brichs:jm

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1. Joseph DUTKANICZ. (see Embassy Despatch 851, dated March 27, 1962): Subsequent to the information which has already been reported on Dutkanicz, his wife departed for the United States, and he is making every effort to bring about his own release. He was awarded Soviet citizenship by a special decree of the Supreme Soviet, apparently for his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviets while he was still a member of the U.S. Army in Germany, but his present citizenship status with respect to his American citizenship is unclear. For the time being, at least, Dutkanicz is residing in Lvov with his three children (all of whom are American citizens), trying to figure out how he can get back to the U.S.A. He called the Embassy as recently as the 17th or 18th of April in an effort to determine what he should next undertake in his efforts to get back to the U.S.A., and was merely told that he will require a Soviet exit visa before he can leave. In his call, he also mentioned that he had received a severe grilling from the Soviet authorities for having visited the American Embassy in Moscow, and indicated that they were more than a bit displeased with his conduct on that occasion. Since he has received an "Undesirable Discharge" from the U.S. Army and was granted Soviet citizenship by special decree, his American citizenship is in doubt at the moment, and even were it to be established, it is at best problematical if the Soviets will issue him an exit visa and permit him to leave the country.

2. Vladimir SLOBODA. (see: Embassy Despatch 841, dated March 23, 1962): Although Sloboda is equally anxious to leave the Soviet Union, his case at the moment appears rather hopeless; his wife has returned to England, but he remains with his three children in Lvov, although his wife plans to initiate measures from England to secure the release of the three children to her. A letter has recently been sent to Sloboda by the Embassy requesting him to come in to arrange for the renewal of his child's passport, since one of the children, Victor Edwin, is an American citizen by birth, although his passport has expired.

3. Robert WEBSTER: After a considerable period of delay, Webster has now received an exit permit from the Soviet authorities, but the Embassy is awaiting Departmental advisory approval before issuing an American passport for his return to the U.S.A.

4. Lee OSWALD: It has been determined that Oswald, the ex-Marine, is still an American citizen; both he and his Soviet wife now have exit permits, and the Department has given approval for their travel with their infant child to the U.S.A. There is a problem with his wife, however, in that SOV in the Department is trying to get a waiver of 2403, which requires that Oswald's wife pick up her visa for entry into the U.S.A. in Western Europe. As soon as this question has been settled, they will be free to travel.

Kerris and Kelly

*Transmitted by SO/Inward
Ltr. of 4/23/62*

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5. Morris and Molly BLOCK: The Block couple are still in Odessa, awaiting an advisory opinion from the Department on the issuance of passports. The Soviet authorities have apparently assured them that they will receive exit visas with no difficulty. Apparently, both Morris and Molly are still American citizens, even though at the moment they hold stateless passports. Both are aware that they are liable to prosecution in the United States for applying for passports in a false name--in point of fact, Morris actually travelled under an assumed name, although his wife utilized her genuine passport for this travel. There is, however, some problem concerning their adopted Greek child, in connection with the child's entry into the United States and the Embassy is currently awaiting an advisory opinion from the Department on the child's admissibility.

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Commission No. 347

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE SUBJECT AND
METHODS INVOLVED

31 January 1964

Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of
Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City
28 September - 3 October 1963

I. OSWALD's Activity in Mexico City


1. On 9 October the CIA Station in Mexico City received the following information from a reliable and proven source:

An American named Lee OSWALD had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October 1963. He had spoken in halting Russian to the Soviet Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier, Saturday, 28 September. He asked whether there had been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had promised to send to Washington. OBYEDKOV had attempted to establish the identity of the Consul with whom OSWALD had talked: if it had been a dark person, then it had probably been KOSTIKOV. OBYEDKOV,

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after a check with Soviet Consular personnel, assured OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but no answer had been received.

The information was forwarded by cable to CIA Headquarters the same day it was received.

2. A file check in Washington which is routine in these matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the Lee OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably with KOSTIKOV, and the defector returnee, Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

3. On 10 October 1963 CIA Headquarters disseminated by cable the report in substantially the form and in the detail indicated above, in paragraph 1, to the Federal agencies whose jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of OSWALD's file: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Depart-

* The CIA file on Lee Harvey OSWALD was opened on 9 December 1960 to accommodate biographic information developed by CIA in response to an inquiry from the Department of State on a list of American defectors in Soviet Bloc countries. OSWALD's was among the names in the list. The Department of State inquiry was dated 25 October 1960. An interim reply was given by CIA on 3 November 1960; a final reply, on 21 November 1960. Until early October 1963 the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Navy Department.


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ment of State, the Navy Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that the subject, Lee OSWALD, was probably identical with the former Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (The report disseminated by CIA in Washington on 10 October also included a physical description of an individual who was believed to have been the OSWALD who had contacted the Soviets in Mexico City. It was subsequently established by investigation that the description did not pertain to OSWALD.)

4. On the same day, 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station of the background information held in the Headquarters' file on OSWALD. An instruction was included for the Mexico City Station to pass the substance of its 9 October report to the local representatives of the same Federal departments and agencies that had been given the information in Washington. This instruction was immediately carried out. In this manner the information on OSWALD's contact with the Soviets on 1 October was passed in Mexico City to the Embassy, the FBI representative, the Naval Attache, and to the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. There were no requests from recipients of the report for further information or for follow-up investigation.

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5. After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey OSWALD, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City to determine the purpose of OSWALD's visit. It was learned that OSWALD had also visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and had talked there with a clerk, a Mexican national, named Silvia DURAN. After the assassination and the publicity about Lee OSWALD, Silvia DURAN had told a number of relatives and friends that she had talked to OSWALD about a Cuban visa. Silvia DURAN and her husband, Horazio DURAN Navarro, were detained and questioned by the Mexican police from 23 to 25 November 1963.

6. After giving some of the details of her own personal background - she is an admitted Leftist sympathizer and had formerly worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - Silvia DURAN said that when she first heard of the death of President Kennedy she had been depressed and thought the assassin must have been a maniac. When she learned that he was associated with the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" she did not believe it.

7. She talked about the case to her husband and when she heard the name of Lee OSWALD mentioned, she recognized it as



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the man who had come to the Consulate about two months before to get a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the USSR. She realized that he had said he was married to a Russian and that he had belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba" group. She checked her file on him in the Consular archives and from the descriptive data, she was sure it was the same man. He was short, blond, poorly dressed and his face got red when he talked. He was denied a Cuban transit visa because he did not yet have a Soviet visa, and he was told to get the Soviet visa first, but it was noted that this would take about four months. She had asked the Cuban Consul himself, Eusebio AZCUE, to talk to OSWALD and they had an argument when AZCUE urged OSWALD to leave Mexico instead of waiting there. The Consul had phoned the Soviet Consulate and talked to the person handling OSWALD's case, who had said it would take about four months to hear from Moscow about the Soviet visa. The same afternoon, OSWALD had come back again and she had told him the same thing. She gave OSWALD a slip of paper with her name and telephone number on it in case he ever got his Soviet visa. He did not call back, she said.

8. Silvia DURAN's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, gave essentially the same story, as he had previously heard it from his wife after the assassination. He had never had any personal contact with OSWALD.

9. Silvia DURAN was reinterrogated by the Mexican police from 27 to 29 November but she did not change or add materially to her story about OSWALD.

10. It is known that the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, reported on the detainment and interrogation of Silvia DURAN by the Mexican authorities. The Cuban Government sent the Mexican Government a stiff note of protest, which the Mexicans rejected.

11. We are reliably informed that on 26 September, the day after DURAN's release, Cuban President DORTICOS queried HERNANDEZ about his report. HERNANDEZ confirmed that there had been an altercation between OSWALD and Consul AZCUE. DORTICOS made a persistent but unsuccessful effort to determine from HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican authorities had questioned Mrs. DURAN about money, or thought that the Cubans had paid OSWALD money.

12. The CIA follow-up investigation produced the following confirmed results which have a bearing on Mrs. DURAN's account:

a. 27 September. In mid-afternoon, Silvia DURAN informed the Soviet Embassy that a male American citizen had requested a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the

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Soviet Union. She desired to know who the American had talked with at the Soviet Consulate. Also, she indicated that the Cuban Consulate could grant him the visa and arrange immigration details if the concession of a Soviet visa were assured.

b. 27 September. Pursuant to her inquiry, Silvia DURAN received a confirmation from the Soviet Embassy that the American had been to the USSR installation. He had shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been long awaiting a visa for himself and his wife to go to the USSR. No answer had come from Washington; however, the waiting period was sometimes four or five months. The American also had a letter attesting that he was a member of a pro-Cuban organization but he had claimed that the Cubans would not give him a visa unless he had already received a Russian visa.


Although the American was still at the Cuban Consulate, Silvia DURAN repeated that she could not give him a transit visa unless a Soviet visa was forthcoming, notwithstanding the American's wish to go to Cuba to wait

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there for his Soviet visa. According to DURAN, the American knew no one in Cuba and she intended to appropriately annotate the American's card. The Soviet official echoed her statement that the American was not known.

c. 28 September. Silvia DURAN was again visited at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City by the American seeking a Cuban transit visa. Mrs. DURAN contacted at least two members of the Soviet Embassy and facilitated a direct conversation between one of the Soviets and the American. Conversing in poor Russian, the American stated that he already had been to the Soviet Consulate and had left an address. The Soviet official replied that he was aware of that. The American suggested that he had not known his address then, and he had gone to the Cuban Embassy to ask for the address, because they had it. The American then acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give them the address.

d. 1 October. In mid-morning an unidentified individual, speaking broken Russian, contacted the Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City. He said he had been to



the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September) and had talked with a Consul who had said they would send a telegram to Washington: had there been a reply? He was referred to the Consulate for the information.

These additional materials were promptly disseminated in Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

e. 1 October. See paragraph 1 above for Lee OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Consulate.

II. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

13. It is believed that the Soviet official with whom OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attache Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933. A photograph of KOSTIKOV is attached. In his letter of 9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN (sic) of the Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico." There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

14. KOSTIKOV is the senior officer of five Soviet Consular representatives who deal with visas and related

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matters. There is firm evidence for the conclusion that KOSTIKOV is a Soviet State Security (KGB) officer, and the other four Consular officers are also known or strongly suspected to be Soviet State Security personnel serving under official cover. The State Security Service is the major of the Soviet intelligence services and it is charged with espionage, counterintelligence and related matters inside the Soviet Union and overseas.

15. It must be clearly stated that Soviet intelligence and security officers placed abroad under official cover normally are required to perform the routine and legitimate business demanded by the cover job in an embassy or consulate.

16. KOSTIKOV was first spotted as a KGB man because of his travels around Mexico, his habitual association with known KGB officers, and because consuls, in Soviet practice, are usually KGB men.

17. KOSTIKOV is believed to work for Department Thirteen of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. It is the Department responsible for executive action, including sabotage and assassination. These functions of the KGB are known within the Service itself as "Wet Affairs" (mokryye dela). The Thirteenth Department headquarters, according to very reliable information, conducts interviews or, as appropriate, file reviews on every foreign

military defector to the USSR to study and to determine the possibility of utilizing the defector in his country of origin.

18. An intensive review of the files of our Mexico City Station was undertaken immediately after the assassination to comb out any previously unreported information about KOSTIKOV's activity. No useful new information bearing on the assassination resulted from this effort.

19. A close observation was maintained on the Soviet personnel, KOSTIKOV in particular, for days after 22 November. Nothing unusual or out-of-pattern was noted in the activity or movements of the Soviet personnel.

20. It is of parenthetic interest, however, that the Soviet Ambassador, when he made his call of sympathy on the American Ambassador, 23 November, was accompanied by two ranking intelligence officers who are in the Soviet installation under diplomatic cover. One is known to be from the State Security Service and the other is an identified Soviet General Staff Intelligence (GRU) officer.


III. Monetary Payment to OSWALD - Investigation of Allegation


21. On 26 November 1963 a young Nicaraguan named Gilberte ALVARADO Ugarte walked into the U.S. Embassy in



Mexico City and claimed he had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on 18 September 1963 when a man he later recognized to be Lee OSWALD had been given \$6,500 in cash to kill someone. ALVARADO was known to CIA as a former informant of a Central American security service and to have been used to penetrate communist guerrilla groups. He said that he was in Mexico City still working for his service, trying to get himself accepted by the Cubans as a communist so they would take him to Cuba for guerrilla training. ALVARADO clearly was a trained intelligence agent and he was able to describe people and locations well. He had apparently visited the Cuban Embassy and its Consular offices on a number of occasions and he correctly identified some twenty Cuban Embassy and Consular employees.

22. While intensive investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive interrogation failed to shake ALVARADO's story. However, the Central American service for which he claimed to be acting, denied that he was still working for them.






23. On 28 November 1963, the Mexican police took ALVARADO over for further interrogation. At first, ALVARADO persisted in his story, but on 30 November he finally admitted in a signed statement that he had fabricated the whole incident of seeing OSWALD in the Cuban Consulate being paid to kill someone.

24. Once released, however, ALVARADO promptly retracted his confession, claiming that it had been extorted under threat of extreme duress.

25. Under ordinary circumstances CIA would have disregarded this retraction. But because of the importance of resolving the problem CIA personnel continued the interrogation in close coordination with the FBI. ALVARADO voluntarily agreed to a lie detector examination. A CIA polygraph expert, assisted by an FBI special agent, requestioned ALVARADO and secured admissions that he must have been mistaken. The CIA polygraph expert concluded from the results of his tests that ALVARADO had fabricated his story about OSWALD in toto.


26. It should be noted that when he first told his story on 26 November, ALVARADO could have known from the Mexican press that OSWALD had visited the Cuban Consulate



in Mexico City. Also, he could have heard the rumors current there that OSWALD had \$5,000 with him when he returned from Mexico to the United States. ALVARADO has since been deported by the Mexican authorities to his native Nicaragua.

Attachment - photograph





USSR 1958
KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
V.
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CIA-P-123806

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Photograph of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV